On June 2nd, Claudia Sheinbaum, the candidate from the ruling Morena party (Movimiento de Regeneración Nacional), secured a landslide victory in the presidential elections with nearly 60% of the votes. This historic win makes her the first female president in Mexico’s history. Simultaneously with the presidential race, Mexican voters participated in legislative, state, and municipal elections. However, the electoral process was marred by violence, including assassinations and attacks targeting candidates and political figures. According to ACLED data, over 330 incidents of violence against political figures were recorded during the campaign period, spanning from the start of the federal campaign on March 1st to election day on June 2nd. Tragically, at least 95 of these incidents resulted in fatalities. The 2024 election campaign witnessed an unprecedented surge in violence, surpassing the levels recorded in the 2018 and 2021 general and federal elections, which saw 254 and 257 violent events, respectively.
The heightened violence during the 2024 campaign period extended beyond direct targets. A staggering 553 candidates requested state protection due to threats,16 while others made the difficult decision to withdraw from the race altogether due to intimidation.17 Despite this alarming situation, substantive proposals to address this pervasive issue were notably absent from the platforms of leading presidential candidates.
This report delves into the key trends that emerged during the 2024 election cycle,18 analyzing the period from September 7, 2023 – the official start of the federal electoral cycle as determined by the National Electoral Institute (INE) – to June 15, 2024. This timeframe includes the post-election period from June 2nd to June 15th to account for potential post-electoral disputes or attacks targeting winning candidates.
- Violence Predominantly Targets Local Levels: Over 80% of the 216 violent incidents against candidates, their supporters, or family members were directed at those vying for local positions.
- Relentless Pressure on Local Authorities: Incumbent and former officials not seeking re-election were targeted in over 40% of the violent events.
- Political Violence Extends Beyond Campaign Periods: While violence intensifies during election campaigns, it begins to escalate early in the electoral cycle and persists well after election day.
- Organized Crime Competition Fuels Violence: Six of the ten states with the highest rates of violence against political figures are also among the top ten most affected by organized crime violence, with some notable exceptions.
- Local Power Struggles Are a Significant Driver of Violence: Less lethal forms of unrest, such as riots and property destruction, constituted approximately 30% of the events, indicating that local power struggles and community grievances over electoral irregularities or results can also trigger violence against political figures, not solely organized crime.
Local Elections as Hotspots: The Predominance of Violence at the Local Level
Approximately 40% of violent events targeting political figures during the 2024 election cycle were aimed at candidates running for office. While local, state, and federal elections were held on the same day, the vast majority – over 80% – of the 216 violent incidents directed at candidates, their families, or supporters, targeted political figures competing for local positions, including mayoralties and municipal councils. The remaining 20% encompassed attacks on individuals running for federal positions and former candidates.
Veracruz provides a stark example of how local elections can escalate violence. Unlike most federal entities holding municipal elections in 2024, Veracruz is scheduled to hold these elections in 2025. During the last municipal elections in 2021, Veracruz topped the list of states with the highest level of violence against political figures, recording 57 events in the six months leading up to the vote and the two weeks following. However, this year, ACLED recorded about a quarter of the 2021 figure in Veracruz — 17 events — dropping it to tenth place in the ranking (see graph below). This dramatic shift in violence levels underscores how the absence of municipal elections can correlate with lower levels of violence.
In other states, the presence of local elections also fueled high levels of violence against officials, functionaries, and candidates due to intense power competition. A significant number of candidates running in local elections found themselves targeted by organized crime groups and political rivals. Candidates were particularly vulnerable in the states of Hidalgo, Mexico, Morelos, and Puebla, where they constitute the largest proportion of victims. However, attacks against candidates were deadlier in the states of Chiapas and Guerrero, where 21 and 20 individuals, respectively, were killed in violent incidents involving candidates.
Although on a smaller scale, elections for state-level officials, such as governors and local deputies, also contribute to violence. Several candidates for local congresses were targeted in this electoral cycle, particularly in states holding gubernatorial elections. In Chiapas and Morelos, armed men attacked two state senate candidates from the Fuerza y Corazón por México coalition, while in Veracruz, armed individuals fatally shot a MORENA candidate for local deputy. These instances indicate that while municipal elections are a major trigger for political violence, significant state-level contests can also contribute to the violence observed in 2024.
Of all incidents recorded since the start of the electoral process, at least 69 were perpetrated against women, many of whom were candidates for public office, representing 13% of the violence. However, this should not be interpreted as women being less likely to be targeted. Despite the 2024 elections being notable for women’s candidacies for president, the subsequent victory of Claudia Sheinbaum, and the National Electoral Institute guidelines for parties to ensure gender parity in candidacies, women remain underrepresented in local official bodies. In 2023, only 28% of local posts were held by women.19 In fact, female candidates received more threats than men during the 2024 electoral process,20 often forcing them to withdraw from the race, as was the case for 217 female candidates in Zacatecas alone.21
Pressure on Local Authorities: Officials and Functionaries as Targets
Candidates were not the only political figures exposed to violence in the recent electoral cycle. Over 40% of the 540 incidents of violence were directed against current and former officials not running for election, such as mayors and public functionaries. The persistent violence against these officials and functionaries highlights the intention to exert pressure on political processes beyond election periods.
ACLED data reveals that public officials across different sectors are affected. Officials dealing with judicial and security matters and public administration treasurers were the most frequently targeted among non-elected officials. This trend is largely attributed to organized crime groups’ interest in controlling local resources and key administrative areas, such as security and the judiciary, which can impact their operations. Indeed, public officials not running for election are targeted nationwide, but they represent a greater proportion of victims in states heavily affected by organized crime-related violence, such as Guanajuato, Guerrero, and Michoacán.
Family members of politicians were also among the victims in around 14% of attacks against politicians, either as direct targets or related casualties. Often, violence against family members reflects an intent to pressure a political figure. For instance, in October 2023, suspected members of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) attempted to assassinate the brother of the mayor of Tacámbaro —himself a former mayor— after the group issued threats against him and his treasurer. In at least 28% of these cases, the targeted family members were also public officials or politicians, underscoring that a few families concentrate significant political power but are not spared from attacks, especially in states like Guerrero, Michoacán, and Puebla.
A notable example is the influential Salgado family in Guerrero state. Several family members hold elected positions and have also been targets of threats and attacks in recent years. In August 2023, Zulma Carvajal Salgado —cousin of the governor of Guerrero, Evelyn Salgado Pineda, who succeeded her father, Félix Salgado Macedonio— survived an assassination attempt that resulted in the death of her husband. The attack occurred shortly after she announced her intention to run in the municipal elections of Iguala.
Beyond Campaign Season: Electoral Violence Throughout the Cycle
Similar to previous electoral processes, pre-election unrest, particularly violence against political figures, began to rise even before campaigns officially commenced. Violence targeting political figures experienced an initial spike in October 2023, shortly after the start of a period called citizen support, which began on September 9, 2023, in some states. During this period, aspiring candidates for president, senate, and federal councils gather signatures to run as independent candidates. After a relatively consistent level between November 2023 and January 2024, violent events against political figures increased substantially in February (see graph below). This surge coincided with the end of the pre-campaign period in most states, when aspiring candidates from political parties engage in public activities to gather support for their nominations.
Combined chart – Violence targeting political figures 11 June 2023 to 16 June 2024 – Spanish
Violence against political figures occurring very early in the electoral cycle is often linked to perpetrators’ intentions to mark territory. A violent incident signals that the area is under their influence and aims to deter candidates they deem threatening or unaligned from running.22 The majority of victims in at least 34 events recorded in October 2023 were current or former local representatives and their family members, but some targeted elected positions. For example, on October 4th, the mayor of the Cuauhtémoc district of Mexico City, who was seeking to become a candidate for head of government of Mexico City for the Party of the Democratic Revolution, was attacked by a group of individuals while visiting the capital’s food supply center.
However, violence against political figures escalates once candidacies are defined, as those seeking to influence contests through violent means can more easily identify targets. From the start of the campaign for federal and state elections in March and local elections in April, violence against political figures increased exponentially, peaking at 132 events in May. This surge resulted in 55 fatalities, setting a record in both figures since ACLED began covering the country in 2018. Election day itself experienced the highest number of events against political figures, with 80 recorded events.
Nevertheless, the risks to political figures are unlikely to cease after the elections. In Guanajuato, for instance, armed men attacked the business of the elected mayor of Tarimoro days after he won the election.23 Moreover, past electoral cycles suggest that violence will not only remain high at least until inauguration ceremonies but will persist throughout new administrations. ACLED recorded 210 and 179 events in the six months following the 2018 and 2021 elections, respectively, as well as consistent levels of violence over the years, totaling nearly 3,000 events of violence against political figures since ACLED began its coverage.
Organized Crime: A Major Driver of Election-Related Violence
ACLED records high levels of violence against political figures in the states of Guanajuato and Michoacán, two of the federal entities most affected by organized crime violence in the year leading up to the 2024 vote. This confirms that in certain states, competition between criminal groups drives violence against political figures. Six of the ten states with the highest levels of incidents against political figures during the electoral cycle are also among the ten most affected by organized crime-related violence in the same period (see map below). This is particularly true for Guerrero, which ranks second in the number of violent incidents against political figures, but first in the number of fatalities in these attacks, and fifth for violence likely related to organized crime during the electoral cycle (see table below). In Chiapas, the state with the highest levels of violence against political figures during this electoral process, increased violence linked to the rivalry between the CJNG and the Sinaloa cartel contributed to a surge of over 90% in violence against political figures compared to the 2021 electoral cycle. The high levels of violence led to the cancellation of voting in Chicomuselo and Pantelhó.24
Table – Top 5 Mexican states with highest estimated levels of violence targeting political figures – 7 Sept 2023 – 15 June 2024 – Spanish
However, there are some exceptions to this pattern, particularly when one organized crime group exerts hegemony. Indeed, the states of Jalisco and Sinaloa are among the ten most affected by organized crime violence but are not among those with the most events of violence against political figures. They are also, respectively, the strongholds of the CJNG and the Sinaloa cartel, suggesting that their influence in local politics may be so entrenched that they do not need to resort to violence against political figures to consolidate their influence.25 Much of the violence recorded in those states, in fact, stems from these groups’ tactics to exert territorial control and may occasionally be related to localized disputes with smaller groups, as in the case of violence involving the Nueva Plaza cartel in the Tlajomulco area.26
Conversely, in some cases, the presence of a strong political establishment dominated by a few families also contributes to low levels of violence against political figures. Nuevo León is an example of this. Despite recording some of the highest levels of organized crime violence, violent incidents against political figures have remained limited in the past year. Nuevo León is the second-richest state in the country, with an economy led by export-oriented manufacturing. A small number of families concentrate most of the wealth and political power. The main gubernatorial candidates in the 2021 elections, some of whom are part of these families, have been accused of links to criminal organizations such as Los Zetas and the Gulf Cartel (CDG).27 Furthermore, since the collapse of the hegemony of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in the 1990s, the state has been governed by the Citizen Movement or independent candidates, but MORENA has failed to make significant inroads in the state’s political sphere.28 In the recent elections, in fact, it only won two of the state’s 51 municipalities.29
Local Power Brokers: Competition at the Local Level as a Violence Generator
Beyond direct attacks against political figures, a significant portion — 30% — of incidents manifested as riots and property destruction. These events were linked to expressions of public discontent towards local representatives or rivalries between competing political actors. They were particularly prominent in Chiapas, Puebla, and Hidalgo (see graph below). These three states are more susceptible to local power struggles and electoral disputes due to pre-existing inter-community conflicts and the concentration of power in the hands of local power brokers or caciques.
Before electoral campaigns began, this form of violence primarily erupted during protests where demonstrators confronted representatives for failing to meet their demands. However, property destruction and mob violence can also be employed by political contenders to intimidate their adversaries. Indeed, these events increased markedly during the electoral campaign in April and May and included attacks against the properties of candidates and officials and mob actions against supporters of a rival faction. For example, on May 15th, in Tlanchinol, Hidalgo, armed men shot at a vehicle parked in front of the house of a candidate seeking to join the municipal council for the MORENA-PANAL alliance, who had already reported receiving threats before the elections.
Finally, unrest surrounding election day is often related to the rejection of results or allegations of irregularities or vote-buying during the process by a candidate. For example, on June 1st, in Puebla, a group of 200 people, including supporters of the PRI and the National Action Party (PAN), physically assaulted MORENA members in Venustiano Carranza over alleged vote-buying. Due to the incident, the State Electoral Institute decided to annul the election results due to irregularities.30 Similarly, in Chenalhó, Chiapas, supporters of the Green Party of Mexico clashed during an assembly to elect their representatives amid claims that the unrest was orchestrated by the mayor to prevent his candidate from losing.
