Mexico’s political landscape has undergone a dramatic transformation, a shift underscored by the recent defection of Alejandra del Moral, a prominent figure from the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Del Moral’s move to join forces with Claudia Sheinbaum of the left-leaning Morena party just days before a pivotal election signals a profound realignment in Mexican politics and highlights the dramatic decline of the PRI, once an unshakeable political force in Mexico. This political earthquake would have been unimaginable just a decade prior, given the PRI’s long-standing dominance.
For many years, Alejandra del Moral was synonymous with the conservative Institutional Revolutionary Party, or PRI, a political behemoth that once reigned supreme in Mexico. Her career trajectory within the PRI was meteoric. By 2009, she had become the youngest mayor in Mexico, taking the helm of Cuautitlán Izcalli, a significant suburb of Mexico City, and breaking ground as the first woman to lead the municipality. Her political ascent continued as she represented the PRI in the national Congress, solidifying her position as a rising star within the party ranks.
However, the political winds shifted dramatically. On May 27th, just before a crucial election, a photograph surfaced on social media that sent shockwaves through the Mexican political establishment. It depicted del Moral, smiling and arm-in-arm with Claudia Sheinbaum, a leading figure in the Movement for National Regeneration, Morena, a party positioned on the left of the political spectrum and currently the dominant force in Mexican politics.
This image confirmed the unthinkable: Del Moral had resigned from the PRI. She had chosen to lend her support to Morena, a move that spoke volumes about the PRI’s current standing.
“The PRI that I knew, that I proudly represented and defended, is no longer the same,” del Moral declared in a public statement released the same day. Her words echoed a sentiment felt by many observers of Mexican politics – the PRI was a party in decline.
Sheinbaum, widely expected to win the presidential race on June 2nd, welcomed del Moral’s endorsement. “I thank her for the decision to join our team for the benefit of the Mexican people,” Sheinbaum posted on social media, highlighting the significance of this defection in the lead-up to the election.
This event underscores the changing political tides in Mexico. Throughout much of the 20th century, the PRI exerted an iron grip on Mexican politics. It operated as a single-party regime, bolstered by a massive support base, but simultaneously faced accusations of electoral manipulation and the ruthless use of violence to maintain its grip on power.
The year 2000 marked a turning point. For the first time in 70 years, the PRI lost the presidency, signaling a crack in its seemingly impenetrable armor. In 2012, the party engineered a comeback, reclaiming the presidential palace for a six-year term. However, this resurgence was short-lived. Haunted by persistent corruption scandals that shadowed its candidates, the PRI’s popularity plummeted, with poll numbers sinking to single digits.
The 2018 presidential race further exposed the PRI’s vulnerability. Its candidate finished a distant third, a humiliating outcome for a party that once considered the presidency its birthright. The downward spiral continued in 2023 when del Moral herself lost her bid for the governorship of the State of Mexico. This defeat was particularly significant as it represented the first time in 94 years that the PRI had lost control of one of its traditional stronghold states.
As the June 2nd presidential election approached, the PRI found itself once again lagging in the polls. In a desperate attempt to remain relevant, it formed an alliance with its historical adversaries – the conservative National Action Party (PAN) and the center-left Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). This coalition, however, with Xóchitl Gálvez as its presidential candidate, has struggled to gain traction and mount a serious challenge to Sheinbaum. Pre-election polls consistently showed Gálvez trailing by a significant margin of 20 points or more.
The question then arises: what precipitated the downfall of this once-dominant political institution? How did the PRI, a party that shaped Mexico for generations, fall so dramatically from grace? Experts attribute this decline to a complex interplay of factors, most notably a deeply ingrained history of violence and corruption.
The PRI’s “Well-Oiled Machine” of Power
Luis Herrán, a professor of Latin American history at the University of New Mexico, explains that the PRI’s longevity was largely due to its ability to construct and maintain a “well-oiled machinery” of political power. This intricate system allowed the PRI to exert control from the highest levels of the presidency down to the most local levels of governance.
“The PRI had built this capacity to bring together all sorts of regional power,” Herrán told Al Jazeera, emphasizing the party’s extensive network of influence.
He further elaborated that at the national level, the PRI successfully garnered support from diverse sectors of society, including “the military, industry and landed elites but also popular sectors” such as labor unions and peasant organizations. This broad base of support was crucial to the PRI’s enduring dominance.
The PRI’s origins can be traced back to 1929, in the aftermath of the Mexican Revolution. Generals who had amassed wealth and power during the revolution established the National Revolutionary Party. Their primary objective was to bring stability to a nation still recovering from years of conflict, and, crucially, to solidify their own positions of power.
In this endeavor, they were remarkably successful. For decades that followed, the PRI held not only the presidency but also a majority in both chambers of the Congress, as well as every single governorship across the country. It was not until 1989 that the party suffered its first defeat in a gubernatorial race, a testament to its near-total political hegemony.
To cultivate voter loyalty, the PRI strategically crafted a mythology of revolutionary nationalism. At one point, it even briefly rebranded itself as the Party of the Mexican Revolution before settling on the name Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in 1946.
Despite its ostensibly center-left origins, the PRI was, above all else, a pragmatically adaptable political entity, a political chameleon capable of shifting its ideological hue to maintain its grip on power.
Over the decades, experts contend, the PRI meticulously built a sprawling system comprising thousands of local power brokers and political offices. This extensive network enabled the party to respond to the demands of the electorate while simultaneously ensuring its continued political dominance.
Homero Campa Butrón, a journalist and academic who edits the magazine Proceso, explained to Al Jazeera that this extensive and pervasive system established a direct channel of communication and influence between the presidency and the general population.
“Through the PRI, social benefits came to the population. Through the PRI, demands from the population came up to the president,” Campa Butrón stated, highlighting the party’s role as an intermediary between the state and society.
However, he also emphasized the inherently political nature of this system. It was, he argued, “a political instrument”, designed to be “at the disposition of the president,” effectively concentrating power in the executive branch and under the control of the PRI.
The PRI’s Steep Decline: Violence, Corruption, and Neoliberalism
By the late 1960s and early 1970s, the PRI’s carefully constructed image began to crack. The party was increasingly implicated in overseeing a brutal “dirty war” against dissenters. This period of state-sponsored repression resulted in the deaths of thousands of left-wing activists, peasant leaders, and student protesters.
One of the most horrific episodes of this era occurred in 1968. Students gathered in the Plaza de Tlatelolco in Mexico City to peacefully protest, just days before the city was scheduled to host the Olympic Games. Their demonstrations voiced opposition to government violence and the PRI’s authoritarian leadership.
The government’s response was devastating. At least 360 snipers were positioned atop buildings overlooking the plaza and opened fire on the unarmed protesters. The Tlatelolco massacre resulted in the deaths of at least 44 people, though some unofficial estimates put the death toll as high as 300.
The Tlatelolco massacre remains a scar on Mexico’s collective memory and continues to resonate in contemporary politics. Sheinbaum, for example, has identified herself as a “daughter of ’68” during her campaign, invoking the spirit of the protest movement and asserting that its “heirs” are committed to “build a fairer country.”
Adding to the PRI’s woes, accusations of widespread voter fraud mounted as its decades-long reign continued.
The 1988 presidential election became a flashpoint for these accusations. The PRI was widely suspected of rigging the election to prevent Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, the popular presidential candidate from the rival PRD party, from winning.
Representatives from opposition parties reported numerous “irregularities” at polling stations. On election night, as initial tallies indicated Cárdenas was leading, the system for tabulating votes mysteriously “crashed,” leading to widespread public outrage and suspicion.
Days later, the electoral commission declared the PRI candidate the winner. The phrase “the system crashed” — “se cayó el sistema” — has since become a euphemism for election fraud in Mexico, forever associated with the PRI’s tactics to cling to power.
In the decade that followed, hundreds of PRD candidates and activists were murdered, often in incidents of election-related violence, as the PRI’s grip on power began to loosen.
Simultaneously, the PRI implemented radical neoliberal economic reforms, culminating in the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). This trade agreement was criticized for undermining rural farmers and fueling the expansion of Mexico’s low-wage manufacturing — or maquiladora — industry, further exacerbating social and economic inequalities.
“Ironically, neoliberalism has swept from under the party’s feet the social system that was the electoral backbone of the party in the 20th century,” Edwin Ackerman, a professor of Latin American history at Syracuse University, told Al Jazeera. He argued that these policies eroded the very foundations of the PRI’s support base.
The party, he asserted, “was never able to stop that haemorrhage, to substitute that with a new type of constituency.” The PRI failed to adapt to the changing socio-economic landscape it had helped create.
The Rise of Morena and the PRI’s Uncertain Future
The election of President Enrique Peña Nieto in 2012 offered a brief period of respite and a seeming comeback for the PRI. Experts suggest that public dissatisfaction with escalating violence played a role in propelling the PRI back to the presidential palace. Peña Nieto was presented as a youthful and modern face for the party, a departure from its tarnished past.
However, his administration was plagued by persistent corruption scandals and the unrelenting violence that continued to plague the country. These issues quickly eroded public trust in the PRI once again.
In Mexico, presidents are constitutionally limited to a single term. By the time the 2018 presidential race approached, Peña Nieto’s approval ratings had plummeted to abysmal levels.
The perceived failures of his administration paved the way for a new dominant force to emerge in Mexican politics: the Morena Party, led by the immensely popular left-wing President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, widely known by his initials AMLO.
Morena is poised to achieve a sweeping victory in the June 2nd election, expected to win races at all levels of government. López Obrador’s hand-picked successor, Sheinbaum, is also overwhelmingly favored to win the presidency, solidifying Morena’s position as the ascendant political power.
In contrast, the PRI’s coalition, “Strength and Heart for Mexico,” has struggled to gain traction with voters.
“Nobody is proud of going in a coalition with the PRI,” Ackerman observed. “There’s a lot of negative associations with it. And this has accentuated internal party conflicts.” The PRI’s baggage of corruption and authoritarianism has become a liability, even for its allies.
Some experts, like Herrán, point to the leadership of PRI director Alejandro “Alito” Moreno as a contributing factor to the party’s internal fractures and declining fortunes.
Moreno has faced accusations of alienating factions within his own party through alleged influence peddling and mismanagement. These internal conflicts have led to high-profile defections, such as that of del Moral, who chose to abandon the PRI for Morena.
“After the election,” Campa Butrón predicts, “there will be a flourishing of internal dissent and probably more flights towards Morena.” He anticipates further erosion of the PRI’s ranks as disillusioned members seek political opportunities elsewhere.
Campa Butrón posits that Morena is, in many ways, inheriting Mexico’s tradition of one-party dominance – albeit under a different ideological banner and with a different name.
“The local power elites who once aligned with the PRI are now aligned with Morena,” he argues, suggesting a continuity of power structures despite the apparent political shift.
These elites, he contends, “don’t care” about “principles or ideologies but rather, the party that guarantees the continuity of their influence.” Pragmatism and the pursuit of power, rather than ideological conviction, drive their political allegiances.
“In fact — by its conduct, by the manner in which it operates, for the project of power it embodies, for its political culture, the personalities that represent it — for many people, Morena is a reconverted PRI.” Campa Butrón concludes, highlighting the striking similarities between the two parties in terms of their power dynamics and operating styles.
The primary distinction, he adds, is that Morena presents itself as left-wing, while the PRI has progressively drifted towards the right of the political spectrum.
Herrán echoes this sentiment, noting the parallels between Morena and the PRI’s former power structure.
Like the PRI in its heyday, he observes, “Morena has become this very heterogeneous party, absorbing these local and regional political groups and launching them onto the national scene through candidacies.” Morena has successfully replicated the PRI’s model of incorporating diverse regional power bases into a national political machine.
However, Herrán questions the long-term sustainability of Morena’s dominance, particularly after López Obrador leaves office. “It remains to be seen what happens with Morena after AMLO leaves power.” The party’s future may depend on its ability to maintain unity and popular support in the post-AMLO era.
In the meantime, experts suggest that the PRI is now focused on carving out a niche for itself as a minority party, hoping to hold onto enough political capital to become a kingmaker, wielding crucial swing votes in Congress.
The Mexican political system mandates that a party needs only 3 percent of the national vote to qualify for state funding. This provision ensures the PRI’s survival, albeit in a significantly weakened state.
“In Mexico state, Veracruz, Chiapas, they will remain a political force,” Herrán concludes, suggesting that the PRI will persist in certain regional strongholds, “trying to stay alive within the ecosystem of Morena-dominated politics.” The PRI, once the hegemonic power in Mexico, now navigates a drastically altered political landscape, struggling to remain relevant in the shadow of Morena’s ascendancy.
Source: Al Jazeera
